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The EU Financial Transactions Tax: 
Antecedents and Current Debate 
 
Summary: The paper deals with the development of the Financial Transactions
Tax (FTT) policy idea and its feasibility in the absence of global coordination.
New taxes are evaluated in terms of how they fit into existing national tax sys-
tems. Increasingly, however, cross-border issues assume greater significance 
in tax design and this is particularly pertinent in the case of FTT which has a
long history. The various changes in tax systems and the economic environ-
ments within which they operate since the original “Tobin Tax” proposal are
noted and the way they affect the debate on FTT are discussed. The proposal
to introduce a unilateral FTT in the EU and its feasibility are examined. In terms
of achieving its fundamental objectives the feasibility of the tax is crucial un-
less, as may be the case in the UK, the need to rebalance the economy away
from the financial sector is a more urgent priority.
Key words: Financial transactions tax, Tobin tax, Computerised financial trad-
ing, Global tax coordination. 
JEL: F31, G15.
 
 
 
 
The issue of global tax coordination is particularly pertinent in the case of the Finan-
cial Transactions Tax (FTT) which has a long history going back to John M. Keynes 
(1936, 1980) and James Tobin (1972, 1978). When Tobin (op.cit) revived Keynes’s 
(op.cit) idea of a “government transfer tax” on financial transactions it was intended 
to be a global tax. Its primary purpose was to curb speculation in foreign exchange 
markets in the context of the Bretton Woods system that in the early 1970s was on its 
way out. The revenue raising potential of the tax to be used for aid to developing 
countries was an additional but secondary objective. Nowadays, although curbing 
speculation and revenue raising still remain the principal justifications for the intro-
duction of an FTT the debate is conducted in an environment in which tax systems 
and global economic conditions have changed significantly since the original “Tobin 
Tax” proposal.  
The main aim of this paper is to assess the development of the FTT policy 
proposal in the light of the various changes in taxation and economic environments 
that have occurred in the past forty years. Section 1 examines some of the most sig-
nificant changes since the original “Tobin Tax” proposal and Section 2 outlines the 
main elements of the current EU FTT proposal. Section 3 evaluates the feasibility of 
the EU proposal. Section 4 draws some conclusions.  
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1. Changes in Tax Systems and Economic Environment since the 
1970s 
 
Most industrial countries raise the bulk of their revenue from taxes on income, 
spending, corporate profits and local property taxes. This general picture has not 
changed significantly since the 1970s (for information about taxation in the EU 
Members see European Commission 2007). However, there have been some impor-
tant changes. With regard to direct taxes there have been some dramatic reductions in 
tax rates for both income and corporation taxes. In the UK the top marginal tax rates 
of 83% on earned and 98% on unearned income were reduced to 40% for most of the 
period while the basic income tax rate declined from 33% to 20%. Corporation tax 
declined from 52% to a projected 23% in 2014. Similar trends are observed interna-
tionally (Institute of Fiscal Studies 2011). With regard to indirect taxation the com-
position of indirect taxes also changed significantly during the period. Between 1975 
and 2008, the proportion of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) tax revenues coming from “general” consumption taxes like Value-
Added-Tax (VAT) rose from 13% to 20% while the proportion coming from “specif-
ic” consumption taxes like excise duties fell from 18% to 10 (OECD 2011)
1. Despite 
the increased importance of VAT as a source of tax revenue the financial sector is 
almost universally exempt from VAT.
2 This is the case in more than 150 countries 
that use VAT, including all OECD countries (excluding the US) and the whole of the 
European Union. This represents serious under-taxation of the financial services sec-
tor, the degree of which has increased as the standard VAT rate increased over time. 
Although the dramatic reduction of tax rates in direct taxation and the expansion of 
“general” consumption taxes like VAT (from which the financial services sector is 
excluded) are the most significant changes in tax systems since the original “Tobin 
Tax” proposal, there have been some notable additional new taxes particularly on 
financial transactions. In the 1970s there were hardly any taxes on financial transac-
tions. Currently some 40 countries use some sort of FTT (Daiana Beitler 2010; 
Thornton Matheson 2011).
3 
At the same time there have been equally striking changes in the technological 
and economic environment in which tax systems operate during the same period. At 
the technological level the most significant development has been the emergence of 
computerised trading in financial markets and computerised tax collection systems. 
With regard to the economic environment, three changes are of particular importance 
in a debate on tax policy in general and the FTT in particular. First, inequalities in 
income and wealth have increased considerably (Branko Milanovic 2011). Second, 
the role of the financial services sector in the economy also increased in many signif-
                                                        
1 OECD. 2011. http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV. 
2 The standard argument for exemption is that the charges for many of the services provided by the finan-
cial services sector, particularly banking services, are implicit rather than explicit. 
3 The countries which have implemented this kind of tax are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.  
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icant ways.
4 Third, due to increased globalisation and increased international mobili-
ty of individuals and companies cross-border issues in taxation are now far more im-
portant than forty years ago (for a discussion about globalization and tax design see 
James R. Hines and Lawrence H. Summers 2009). 
How do these changes affect the current debate concerning the introduction of 
a “Tobin Tax”?
5 First, following the global financial crisis of 2008, a FTT is no 
longer seen as primarily an instrument of curbing foreign exchange speculation. The 
tax is now seen as a means of reducing market volatility and excessive speculation in 
financial markets and as a safeguard against future financial crises. The revenue col-
lected by a FTT is now seen more as a means of compensating the public sector for 
the post 2008 public sector bail-out of the financial sector and as an insurance pre-
mium in case of any need to deal with systemic risk problems in the banking sector. 
Second, the changes in direct taxation involving dramatic reductions in income and 
corporation tax rates combined with the unprecedented rise in inequalities in income 
and wealth have introduced a new justification for the FTT. Third, the change in the 
composition of indirect taxation and the expansion of “general” consumption taxes 
like VAT combined with the secular increase in the size of the financial services sec-
tor has strengthened the case for a FTT given the under-taxation of the sector by its 
exclusion from VAT. It has also re-ignited the debate of whether the removal of this 
favourable treatment might be one of the options to be considered in any rethinking 
of the way the financial services sector is being taxed. Fourth, changes in technology 
have had a radical impact on financial market organisation, market operation and tax 
administration. In the past forty years financial market transactions have been sup-
ported by clearance and settlement systems which have become highly automated, 
centralised, and integrated thus greatly facilitating tax administration (see John D. 
Brondolo 2011).  
The revolutionary changes in information technology have both strengthened 
and weakened the case for a FTT. To the extent that technology has improved the 
cost-effectiveness and ease of administration of the tax, the case for a FTT has been 
strengthened. Moreover, if computerised trading, especially high-frequency trading 
(HFT), is considered to be a significant factor in contributing to market volatility and 
excessive speculative activity, a FTT would be desirable if it can limit such socially 
useless and risky speculative activity (see also Carsten Sieling 2012). On the other 
hand to the extent that technology has transformed financial markets by moving 
trades away from physical trading floors to cyber space, the case for a FTT that is not 
global has weakened considerably if trades can be diverted in a matter of seconds to 
financial centres with the lowest transaction costs, taxes and regulation. 
Finally, a dramatic change since the original “Tobin Tax” proposal has been 
the proliferation of FTT of different varieties and in different countries and financial 
centres. This has some important ramifications with regard to Tobin’s original insis-
tence that the transfer tax needed to be a global tax. In the 1970s none of the current 
                                                        
4 Fundación Ideas (2010) reports that the volume of financial transactions is 70 times greater than the 
current world GDP while in 1995 it was around 25 times.  
5 Phillip A. O’Hara (2011) suggests the Tobin tax as another “tool” to balance the economy in the current 
context.   
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40 “unilateral” FTTs were in existence (for examples and discussion of existing va-
rieties of FTT
 see Brondolo 2011).  
 
2. The EU FTT Proposal 
 
Given the difficulties involved in reaching a global agreement on a global FTT, the 
focus of attention has shifted towards the European proposal for a FTT within the 
EU. According to the EC draft directive (European Commission 2011a) the EU FTT 
proposal will contribute significantly “to the on-going international debate on finan-
cial sector taxation and in particular to the development of a FTT at global level. In 
order to best minimise risks, a coordinated approach at international level is the best 
option. The present proposal demonstrates how an effective FTT can be designed and 
implemented, generating significant revenue. This should pave the way towards a 
coordinated approach with the most relevant international partners.”  
Although a coordinated global approach to the introduction of FTT is desira-
ble it is not a pre-condition for the coordinated adoption of a FTT in the EU. Given, 
however, the UK’s stated opposition to the introduction of a FTT in the EU unless it 
is part of a global agreement and the continued objection to the tax by several other 
EU member states, the adoption of an EU-wide tax seems highly unlikely. Even 
though the FTT may not be implemented in all 27 member states of the EU, given 
the strong support for the tax in Germany and France, it may still be introduced under 
enhanced cooperation to a sub-set of mainly eurozone countries. The greater the par-
ticipation in a harmonised FTT the greater the benefits of membership of the scheme 
will be. This is because if uncoordinated tax measures are put in place it may lead to 
fragmentation in the internal market for financial services.  
What are the main features of the Commission’s FTT proposal? There are four 
principal policy goals:   
i. A fairer contribution of the financial sector. Given the current under-
taxation of the sector and its role in causing the Great Recession the tax is seen as a 
fair contribution by the sector towards the 4.6 trillion euros cost of dealing with the 
crisis (Yaldaz Sadakova 2012).  
ii. Financing the EU Budget. The FTT is seen by the Commission as an inde-
pendent source of “own resources” means of financing the EU Budget replacing na-
tional contributions (Stephan Schulmeister 2009). 
iii. A complement to regulatory reform in the EU. The FTT is not considered 
as a substitute for a reformed regulatory framework but it can contribute to the estab-
lishment of a safer financial sector by “addressing particularly risky behaviour in 
some segments of financial markets” and by creating “appropriate disincentives for 
transactions that do not enhance the efficiency of financial markets” (European 
Commission 2011b). 
iv. Proving a lead for the development of FTT at the global level. The Com-
mission believes that a “unilateral” EU tax can “pave the way towards a coordinated 
approach with the most relevant international partners” (European Commission 
2011b).  
The tax will be applied to all transactions on financial instruments between fi-
nancial institutions broadly defined to include “investment firms, organised markets,  
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credit institutions, insurance and reinsurance undertakings, collective investment un-
dertakings and their managers, pension funds and their managers, holding compa-
nies, financial leasing companies, special purpose entities” (European Commission 
2011b). Transactions within the European Central Bank and National Central Banks 
are excluded.  
The tax will have a wide scope, covering transactions relating to a variety of 
financial instruments including derivatives agreements. Moreover, the tax will be 
applied not only to transactions in organised regulated markets but it will also cover 
other types of trades including over-the-counter trade. Most day-to-day financial ac-
tivities relevant for citizens and businesses remain outside the scope of FTT. This is 
the case for the conclusion of insurance contracts, mortgage lending, consumer cre-
dits, payment services etc. (although the subsequent trading of these via structured 
products is included). Also, currency transactions on spot markets are outside the 
scope FTT, which preserves the free movement of capital. However, derivatives 
agreements based on currency transactions are covered by FTT since they are not as 
such currency transactions.  
The tax will be applied where at least one of the parties is EU based. The pro-
posed minimum tax rates will be 0.1% for bond and equity transactions and 0.01% 
for derivative transactions between financial firms (European Commission 2011b).
6 
Individual member states may apply higher rates. 
 
3. The Feasibility of the EU Proposal in the Absence of Global 
Agreement 
 
The crucial factor in determining the feasibility of a FTT is the extent to which the 
tax could be avoided if imposed unilaterally. A FTT is feasible if it does not create 
opportunities for tax avoidance through mass migration of trade to other financial 
centres; and it is not feasible if it does cause migration and tax avoidance. If trading 
can migrate globally “at the click of a button” is it not pointless to introduce a unila-
teral tax? This in itself constitutes sufficient reason for rejecting a unilateral FTT 
proposal. A FTT, however, may be considered undesirable for a number of additional 
reasons, in which case the question of its feasibility or effectiveness is largely irrele-
vant. The issue of feasibility and effectiveness only becomes important if it is as-
sumed that the tax is on balance desirable. In that case the tax can either be accepted 
as desirable and feasible or rejected as desirable but not feasible. On this basis sup-
porters and opponents of the FTT could fall into one of three categories. First, the tax 
may be rejected as undesirable regardless of feasibility. Second, the tax may be ac-
cepted as both desirable and feasible. Third, the tax may be rejected because al-
though desirable it is not feasible.  
The debate concerning the desirability of the tax, therefore, must precede any 
discussion of feasibility (see David Hillman and Christina Ashford 2012). However, 
the two issues are not always kept separate. The position of the UK government is a 
case in point: it supports the introduction of a FTT but only if it is implemented glob-
ally. The dramatic rejection by the British Prime Minister Mr Cameron of the EU 
                                                        
6 Moreover, the Leading Group (LG) proposes a 0.005% tax on foreign exchange (Leading Group 2010).  
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FTT proposal was on the basis that in the absence of a global agreement the tax will 
harm the position of the City of London as a leading global financial centre. Does 
this mean that if global coordination can be achieved the introduction of a global 
FTT is a good idea? Judging from the pronouncements of the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, Mr Osborne and the governor of the Bank of England, Sir Mervin King, the 
answer is no. Both have expressed serious reservations in principle about the intro-
duction of a FTT.
7  
There are several arguments supporting this view that the FTT is a bad idea in 
principle and it should be rejected regardless of feasibility considerations (see Rafal 
Raciborski, Julia Lendvai, and Lukas Vogel 2012). First, a FTT could lead to a re-
duction in output and growth in the economy. There are theoretical and empirical 
arguments supporting this conclusion.
8 By increasing the cost of capital the FTT 
could lead to lower investment, lower capital stock and ultimately lower growth 
(European Commission 2011b).
9 Second, there may be serious adverse consequences 
on the workings of financial markets. With fewer trades liquidity could be reduced 
and the information content of prices could also be reduced. A decrease in the size of 
financial markets could in fact result in an increase rather than a decline in volatility 
which was one of the main objectives of a Tobin Tax. In any case there is no conclu-
sive evidence that a FTT results in a definite decline in market volatility (see also 
Neil McCulloch and Grazia Pacillo 2010). Third, a FTT is not well suited as a means 
of reducing risk and making finance safer. Its main impact is on short maturity trans-
actions which are not necessarily the main source of risk and instability in the finan-
cial system. Arguably there are merits in curbing ultra-short maturities such as HFT 
which a FTT will undoubtedly achieve. There are, however, alternative ways of curb-
ing HFT, such as requiring a minimum period in which bids and offers must stand, 
without a tax that affects the entire spectrum of financial transactions. Finally, the 
burden of a FTT, like any tax, could in the long run be shifted either forward in the 
form of higher prices or backwards in the form of lower wages. Given the expecta-
tion that with higher cost of capital, following the introduction of the tax, will lead to 
lower capital stock and growth, in the long run the tax will be borne partly by work-
ers in the form of lower wages. For the same reason the revenue raising potential of 
                                                        
7 Mr Osborne is reported to have expressed these additional reservations after the EU Finance Ministers 
meeting of 8 November 2011 (see Ralitza Kovacheva 2011). Sir Mervin King dismissed the idea of a 
“Tobin Tax” at a hearing in the House of Commons (see Emma Saunders 2010).  
8 According to Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees (1971) taxation of intermediate inputs is ineffi-
cient because it produces “cascade effects” throughout the economy which should be avoided. Steve 
Bond, Mike Hawkins, and Alexander Klemm (2004) in their empirical study concerning the effects of the 
UK stump duty on share prices show that the tax depresses share prices especially of those shares which 
are frequently traded.  
9 There is a controversy regarding the impact of the FTT in terms of GDP since more recent work has 
lowered those output losses close to zero. The empirical arguments are conducted in the context of Dy-
namic General Stochastic Equilibrium (DGSE) model where it is inevitable that a tax is found to be “dis-
torting” and reduce output: but then the evaluation should take into account whether the FTT replaces 
another tax (in which case there is the question of which tax is the more “distorting”) and its effects on 
aggregate demand. Stephany Griffith-Jones and Avinash Persaud (2012) point to an expansionary effect 
of this kind of tax if the obtained funds are reinvested in the economy.  
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the FTT must be adjusted downwards to account for the fall in overall tax revenue 
resulting from lower growth.   
We must now consider objections to the FTT based on the absence of global 
coordination and agreement which renders the tax not feasible. Tobin (1972, 1978) 
believed that for his tax to work effectively it was necessary to impose an interna-
tionally-agreed uniform tax. However, the position today with regard to FTTs is quite 
different from the 1970s. As Persaud (2011, 2012) points out since most leading fi-
nancial centres in the world today, including some of the most rapidly growing fi-
nancial centres, impose taxes on financial transactions, the objection to the “unilater-
al” FTT on the grounds of feasibility is no longer convincing. These taxes have been 
introduced “unilaterally” over the years without any loss of competitiveness by the 
country introducing the tax. The one notable exception was Sweden (John Y. Camp-
bell and Kenneth A. Froot 1993; Steven R. Umlauf 1993). The spectacular failure of 
the Swedish experience with a “unilateral” FTT was mainly because it was based on 
residence rather than on the transfer of ownership which is the basis of the UK stamp 
duty. The UK government “unilaterally” introduced the current version of stamp duty 
on financial transactions in 1986 without waiting for an international agreement. It 
has been in operation all this period without modifications or a mass exodus of trad-
ing away from the UK. Persaud (op.cit) maintains that if a similar principle is applied 
to the EU FTT it would remove any objection to the FTT on feasibility grounds. In-
deed according to the EC draft directive mechanisms will be created to ensure that 
EU residents pay the tax regardless of where trade takes place.  
Barry Eichengreen (2012, p. 1) on the other hand is not so optimistic about the 
feasibility of a unilateral FTT. He predicts that “if France imposes the tax unilaterally 
trading in equities and derivatives will simply migrate to Frankfurt. If it is limited to 
the eurozone, transactions will move to London. And if it is adopted by all EU mem-
ber states-a fanciful scenario, given British resistance-the market will simply migrate 
to New York and Singapore”. However well designed the EU tax promises to be, 
Eichengreen claims that the banks will be devising new tax avoidance instruments. A 
unilateral EU FTT may or may not be feasible in the sense that it can be avoided 
through migration of companies or trade. The acceptance or rejection of the proposed 
tax, however, does not hinge entirely on the issue of feasibility. Given the multiplici-
ty of targets it would indeed have been very surprising if the question of feasibility 
was the only objection to the implementation of the tax.  
Like the original “Tobin Tax” proposal the modern version has two aims: 
market stabilisation and revenue raising. The latter aim has several new dimensions. 
First, the revenue raised is seen by the European Commission as an “own resource”, 
increasing the Commission’s budget without the need for additional contributions 
from member governments. Second, it can be seen as “a contribution back to 
society” from the financial sector in the light of the recent bail-outs. Third, many 
supporters of the FTT see it as a redistributive measure. Fourth, the proceeds of a 
FTT can be seen as a means of supporting global developmental and green 
environmental objectives. A new dimension has been added by the announcement of 
the “big four” eurozone countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) following their 
meeting in Rome (on June 22, 2012) that the revenue raised by a future FTT will be  
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used to stimulate growth thereby contributing to deficit reduction and total 
indebtedness in the eurozone. Clearly the achievement of this objective depends a 
great deal on the feasibility of the tax (for alternative views see Persaud 2011, 2012; 
and Eichengreen 2012). 
A FTT may be the wrong tool for raising revenue, especially if its feasibility is 
questioned, but is it an ideal instrument for stabilising financial markets? This goes at 
the heart of the Keynes/Tobin argument that a FTT can limit wasteful and potentially 
harmful speculation without affecting liquidity in financial markets (Keynes 1936, 
1980; Tobin 1972, 1978). Would a comprehensive tax on transactions dampen finan-
cial volatility? We are not any way nearer at resolving this issue now and therefore 
establishing the desirability or otherwise of the FTT as an instrument of regulation 
and stabilisation of the financial sector. An important new dimension, however, has 
been added to the debate. As noted in Section 2 the most important technological 
change, especially in the last ten years, has been the development of computerised 
trading. There is little doubt that a tax on financial transactions will limit transactions 
but the effect will be felt much more acutely by HFT than by traditional institutional 
investors who turn their portfolios less frequently. The crucial question is this: would 
the reduction of HFT improve financial stability? According to Persaud (2011) there 
is little doubt that if a transaction tax limits high-frequency trading it may improve 
systemic resilience. On the other hand, Eichengreen (2012) considers that a unilateral 
FTT in Europe is a distraction which may perversely increase systemic risks and in-
stability.  
How is the achievement of this objective affected by feasibility considera-
tions? If the tax is feasible, which means that it can be implemented unilaterally 
without significant migration of trading activity, then its desirability as a tool of pre-
venting future financial crises depends on the view taken with regard to its principal 
victims, HFT and other short maturity transactions. If the tax is not feasible in the 
sense that if applied unilaterally there will be migration of trading, then there are 
some very interesting implications. An EU-wide FTT will shift trading including 
HFT to other global financial centres. This is no guarantee of global financial stabili-
ty. If the FTT is adopted by some eurozone countries only then there is an interesting 
twist about the effects of this decision on the UK economy, noted recently by Larry 
Elliot (2012). Paradoxically by opting out of the EU FTT the UK government is 
making this imbalance in the economy worse. The absence of a global agreement on 
a FTT could, therefore, be seen as assisting the UK to rebalance its economy and 
could even provide a justification for the UK joining forces with other European 
partners in supporting the “unilateral” introduction of an EU FTT. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The debate on a FTT was initiated by Keynes in the 1930s, revived by Tobin in the 
1970s and now in 2012 we are on the verge of the tax being adopted unilaterally in 
parts of the EU.
10 Tax systems and the economic environments in which tax systems 
operate changed significantly since the original “Tobin Tax” proposal. With regards 
to tax systems, direct taxes have lower tax rates, indirect taxes rely more on VAT-
type taxes from which the financial sector it is still excluded and new FTTs are now 
operating in some 40 countries. With regard to the economic environment, globalisa-
tion has elevated the importance of cross-border issues in taxation and technology 
has revolutionised market trading and tax collection systems. Following the Great 
Recession of 2008, the debate now incorporates issues like redistribution of income 
and wealth, what constitutes a fair taxation of the financial sector and whether a FTT 
can improve systemic stability.  
One important difference between the old debate and the current one concerns 
the question of global cooperation and coordination. Can a FTT operate effectively 
without a global agreement? Tobin thought that the tax needed to be global. Opinion 
on this issue is now more divided. Supporters of the EU FTT argue that the risk of 
migration is now much less than forty years ago since transaction taxes are already in 
place in most major financial centres. Sceptics point out that the comprehensive na-
ture of the unilateral EU tax which includes derivatives and over-the-counter transac-
tions might lead to migration of trade in which case most of the major objectives of 
the tax would not be achieved. Revenue would be much less and systemic risk will 
be exported to other centres without a reduction of global financial instability. The 
UK’s opposition to the FTT which led to the use of its veto in 2011 is producing a 
curious paradox: if it is important that the British economy is rebalanced then the UK 
should support the introduction of a Europe-wide FTT.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
10 There was, of course, considerable discussion of financial transaction taxes in the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s (Lawrence H. Summers and Victoria P. Summers 1989; Mahbub Ul Haq, Inge Kaul, and Isabelle 
Grunberg 1996; Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer 1997; John Grahl and Phothis Lysandrou 2003).  
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